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The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a major piece of EU
legislation that will transform the operating landscape for any organization
that handles data about EU residents. While the regulation, which goes
into enforcement effect on May 25, 2018, will have the greatest impact on
technology companies and advertising networks that directly monetize user
data, the media companies that often depend on them for both reach and
revenue will also be significantly affected by the changes it brings—both
directly and indirectly.
The goal of this report is to provide an overview of the regulation and its
likely impacts for news organizations and publishers with primary audiences
outside the European Union. Unlike its predecessors, the GDPR applies
to organizations that collect data about EU residents, whether or not that
organization has a physical presence in the EU. What’s more, violations
can incur fines of twenty million euros or more. Thus, while non-EU news
organizations may be less likely to come under immediate scrutiny because
of the GDPR, they are still subject to its provisions and will benefit from
thinking strategically about many of the issues it addresses. Moreover,
the GDPR is likely to cause substantial changes in the operations of both
digital platform and advertising companies, the effects of which will have
undeniable consequences for publishers.
Key findings
• The GDPR applies to any organization that offers goods or
services to EU residents and wishes to collect data about them.
In particular, global publishers will be considered “data controllers” with
regard to some of the personal data they collect through their websites,
and therefore will be partly responsible for ensuring their lawful use.
This includes publishers located outside the EU who target content
toward EU residents and host digital ads that collect data about site
visitors, etc.
• The GDPR definition of “personal data” is far broader than is
typically understood in the United States. The GDPR considers
any data that can be linked to a person—even if only in combination
with other data—to be “personal data.” This greatly expands the types
of data that require consent to collect.
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• Consent must be obtained before any data is collected. Con-
sent must also be specific and easily withdrawn. Web pages
that load data-collecting ads before consent is obtained may violate the
GDPR. Likewise, consent notices that employ legalese or require users to
provide information unrelated to the services provided are invalid under
the regulation. Finally, data subjects must be able to access, transfer,
correct, or erase their data at any time, as well as withdraw consent for
its continued use.
• Despite added complexities, media organizations with strong
user trust may gain increased leverage with platform compa-
nies and ad networks once the GDPR is in place. Experts suggest
that because these other players will have difficulty obtaining the con-
sent they need from data subjects directly, publishers with strong user
relationships will be able to do so more effectively and will therefore have




On May 25, 2018, one of this century’s most significant pieces of tech-
nology regulation will take effect. For all residents of the European Union
(EU), the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will fundamen-
tally transform the relationship between organizations that collect data
and the people whom that data is about. While data regulations in the EU
are hardly new—Europe has had digitally oriented legal frameworks for
data in place since the mid-1990s—the GDPR differs substantially from
its predecessors in the scope and immediacy of its impact. Specifically,
this “generational” regulation is both immediately binding on all Member
States, applies to data collected about EU residents by organizations lo-
cated anywhere in the world, and carries significant financial penalties for
non-compliance: fines of up to twenty million euros or four percent of the
company’s annual global revenue.
While there is little doubt that global technology organizations—from
software producers to service providers—will be the most impacted by the
GDPR, because the new regulation applies to any organization that collects
data about EU residents, media companies that target EU audiences will
also be subject to the regulation. As many news organizations’ websites
and apps may be the vehicle for collecting data about users—since they
host, for example, third-party advertisements or even in-house analytics
tools that place cookies on users’ devices—they will also be subject to
GDPR requirements. Indeed, though the simple availability of a website
in the EU is not sufficient for triggering GDPR applicability, any publisher
that targets content to the EU may be subject to the regulation, whether
or not they have an office or other physical presence in the region. Even for
media organizations without an EU audience, the essential ways in which
the GDPR will transform both social media and digital advertising will no
doubt have strong reverberations throughout global publishing.
The purpose of this report, therefore, is twofold. First, it is meant to act
as a primer and reference on the key provisions of the GDPR, with a focus
on how they differ from previous EU regulation, and from prevailing U.S.
customs and law. Second, through review of policy papers and interviews
with industry experts, we offer an overview of the potential impacts of this
regulation on technology platforms, digital advertisers, and publishers. We
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also cover how media companies around the world can begin to prepare for






Background: Privacy, Data Protection, and the GDPR 11
The GDPR is designed to bring consistency and uniformity to the gover-
nance of personal data in the EU. As adopted by the European Parliament,
the GDPR enshrines and enforces Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of the
Fundamental Rights of the European Union drafted in 2000, which “consid-
ers the privacy of communications and the protection of personal data to
be fundamental human rights.”1 Although the Charter itself only became
binding in 2009,2 general EU attitudes toward data privacy were first artic-
ulated in 1995 with the adoption of the Data Protection Directive, estab-
lishing the Article 29 Working Party (WP29, officially the Data Protection
Working Party).3
While the Data Protection Directive outlined many key data rights for
European citizens and created the “Data Protection Authorities” (DPAs)
upon which the GDPR also relies for enforcement, unlike the GDPR, the
actual implementation of the Directive was left up to Member States.
Moreover, territorial applicability of the Data Privacy Directive was am-
biguous:4 to be subject to the Directive, an organization had to use pro-
cessing “equipment” located in the EU. This led both to uncertainty in
enforcement and a series of legal disputes over whether this condition was
met in the case of different digital “equipments”—for example, web cookies,
JavaScript, ad banners, and spyware.
‘Adequacy’ Decisions and Safe
Harbor
Where applicable, the Data Privacy Directive stipulated how information
about EU citizens could be transferred to a country outside the EU, a cir-
cumstance only possible if the European Commission determined that the
country in question offered an adequate level of personal data protection
with “particular consideration given to the nature of the data, the purpose
and duration of the proposed processing operations, the countries of ori-
gin, and final destination of the data, and that country’s laws, rules, and
security measures.”5 These decisions are known as “adequacy decisions.”
While “adequacy decisions” were reached for a number of non-European
countries in the years following the Data Privacy Directive adoption (in-
cluding Andorra, Argentina, Canadian commercial organizations, the
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Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, the Isle of Man, Jersey, New Zealand,
Switzerland, and Uruguay), the absence of “a single, overarching data pri-
vacy and protection framework”6 in the United States prevented it from
receiving an adequacy decision under the Data Privacy Directive.
To ensure that the absence of an adequacy decision did not prevent the
transfer of personal data between the EU and the United States, however,
in 2000 both parties agreed on the “Safe Harbor Privacy Principles.” This
agreement allowed U.S. companies to meet the “adequate level of protec-
tion” required by the Data Protection Directive by self-certifying annually
to the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) that they adhered to certain
data privacy requirements.7 The key principles of these requirements in-
cluded: notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data integrity, access, and
enforcement.i
Although participation in Safe Harbor was open to any U.S. organi-
zation subject to regulation by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or
the Department of Transportation (DOT)—for example, U.S. air carriers
and ticket agents8—it was not the only mechanism through which Amer-
ican organizations could transfer EU data to the United States. Standard
Contractual Clauses (SCC) approved by the European Commission and
Binding Corporate Rules (BCR) were another option for multinational or-
ganizations. Moreover, the European data protection framework provides
derogations under which data can always be transferred, such as: the per-
formance of a contract, legal situations, and any time an organization has
obtained the free and informed consent of the data subject. For example,
this could include having the user accept the Terms of Service or privacy
policy of a website or mobile app.
In principle, Safe Harbor required U.S. companies to self-regulate for
privacy, while persistently failing to do so could potentially expose those
companies to lawsuits in the United States and interrupt their EU-U.S.
data flows. In fact, however, it would not be until an Austrian national,
Maximillian Schrems, filed a lawsuit in Ireland in 2015 that Safe Harbor
would come under review once again.
i. A more detailed description of each of these provisions can be found in Appendix I.
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The U.S. Context
Although the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment is often broadly con-
strued as providing a “right to privacy,” the reality is that, unlike the EU,
the United States “does not have a single, overarching data privacy and
protection framework.”9 Instead, its data privacy laws are often described
“as a ‘patchwork’ of federal and state statutes.”10 In particular, the U.S.
framework rests largely on the concept of Personally Identifiable Infor-
mation (PII), which is similar but not nearly as comprehensive as the EU
concept of personal data.ii
The U.S. Privacy Act of 1974, for example, addresses how the federal
government should manage the personally identifiable information it pos-
sesses (such as Social Security numbers), while the Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act of 1986 extended government restrictions on telephone
wiretapping to include computer transmission of electronic data. Yet for
the most part, federal consumer privacy laws in the United States are al-
most exclusively industry-specific. For example, the 1996 Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), along with its associated
Privacy and Security Rules, places limits on who can access, share, and
transfer many kinds of health data.11 In the education space, the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) limits the ability of edu-
cational institutions to disclose information about a student’s educational
record without the individual’s consent (or parental consent, if the student
is under eighteen years old).12 Individual U.S. states may also have more
general privacy protections in place. For example, Section 1 of the State
Constitution of California names privacy as one of individuals’ “inalienable”
rights.13 In general, however, data collected and shared in the course of
regular business operations not governed by these specific regulations is not
considered private and can be freely bought, sold, and exchanged.
In general, U.S. officials and industry representatives contend that the
U.S. approach is nimbler than the one-size-fits-all EU approach; they also
argue that the U.S. approach promotes and sustains technological inno-
ii. For more on these two related concepts, see Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly
Shmatikov, “Myths and Fallacies of ‘Personally Identifiable Information,’ ” Communi-
cations of the ACM 53, no. 6 (2010): 24–26.
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vations by enabling companies to use personal data in innovative ways,
unhindered by cumbersome data protection regulations. Privacy-related
U.S. advocacy groups in the United States, on the other hand, have long
expressed concerns with the inconsistencies of the U.S. approach, and con-
tinue to urge Congress to enact comprehensive data protection legislation.14
Failure of Safe Harbor
On October 6, 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
declared the Safe Harbor invalid. This decision stemmed from the com-
plaint brought to the Irish DPA by Austrian Maximillian Schrems, concern-
ing the transfer of his data from Facebook’s EU-based servers in Ireland to
Facebook’s servers in the United States.15 Schrems argued that the United
States “does not provide for an adequate level of data protection” since
U.S. authorities may access personal data that is transferred over to Face-
book’s U.S. servers.16 Initially, the Irish DPA dismissed the complaint, find-
ing that it had no basis to evaluate the complaint since Facebook adhered
to Safe Harbor.17 Schrems then took his claim to the Irish High Court,
which referred the case to the CJEU.18
The CJEU’s October 2015 decision declaring Safe Harbor invalid was
based principally on the finding that Safe Harbor has too many loopholes.19
For example, Safe Harbor may not apply if “national security, public inter-
est or law enforcement requirements” are at stake, all relatively vague con-
ditions which may be broadly interpreted. Moreover, U.S. public authorities
such as local and national law enforcement agencies were not required to
comply with Safe Harbor requirements.20 The CJEU concluded that the
Safe Harbor scheme therefore “enables interference” by U.S. authorities, in
part because it does not refer to U.S. rules or effective legal protections for
data subjects, such as the option of judicial redress.21
Safe Harbor 2.0: EU-U.S. Privacy Shield
The CJEU’s ruling led to months of negotiations between the United
States and the EU to replace Safe Harbor. On February 2, 2016, the Eu-
ropean Commission and the U.S. Government reached a political agreement
based on a new framework: the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield. The Commis-
Columbia Journalism School
Background: Privacy, Data Protection, and the GDPR 15
sion adopted the framework on July 12, 2016, and it became operational
shortly thereafter on August 1, 2016.22 At that time, the European Com-
mission also committed to reviewing the Privacy Shield on an annual basis,
to determine if it continued to ensure an adequate level of protection for
personal data.23
The Privacy Shield framework is substantially longer and more detailed
than the Safe Harbor, and was designed in large part to address the prior
agreement’s perceived shortcomings. While the changes are far-reaching,
they focus on addressing three main areas of concern, specifically, the han-
dling of Europeans’ personal data by U.S. companies, the placement of
limits and restrictions on U.S. Government access to and sharing of Euro-
peans’ data, and the creation of judicial redress options for EU citizens who
believe their data has been misused. In addition, companies participating
in the Privacy Shield commit to abiding by the following seven Privacy
Principles,iii which expand on the principles laid out in the Safe Harbor
Agreement: notice requirements, limits on use, opt-out choices,
security assurances, access rights, rights of recourse and liability,
and accountability for onward transfer.iv
Umbrella Agreement, Judicial
Redress, and the Trump
Administration
Foundational to the Privacy Shield negotiations were two key agreements:
the Umbrella Agreement and the Judicial Redress Act of 2015. The Um-
brella Agreement24 protects the personal data of European citizens when
it is exchanged between U.S. and EU law enforcement authorities, while
the Judicial Redress Act extends protections under the U.S. Privacy Act of
1974v to citizens of “covered countries,” a list whose membership the U.S.
iii. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of July 12 (notified under doc-
ument C(2016) 4176) accessible at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016D1250&from=EN
iv. Detailed explanations of the scope of these changes and details of the individual
provisions can be found in Appendix II.
v. As noted above, this Act addresses how the federal government should manage the
personally identifiable information of U.S. persons.
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Attorney General has the discretion to amend. On January 23, 2017, then-
U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch extended this list to include all EU
countries.25
The efficacy of both these agreements and the Privacy Shield in general,
however, became the subject of uncertainty and concern just two days later
when, on January 25, 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order for
“Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States.”26 The Order
requires, in part, that:
agencies shall, to the extent consistent with applicable law, ensure that
their privacy policies exclude persons who are not United States citizens or
lawful permanent residents from the protections of the Privacy Act of 1974
regarding personally identifiable information.27
This raised questions about whether the Order undermined privacy protec-
tions addressed by the Privacy Shield.
The U.S. Department of Justice has assured that this Order will not
affect the privacy rights extended to EU citizens under the Umbrella Agree-
ment, Judicial Redress Act, and Privacy Shield, though privacy advocates
argue that this Order represents a “changed approach to privacy protec-
tions for non-U.S. citizens.”28
The 2017 Privacy Shield Review
The European Commission report of the first Privacy Shield review was
published in October 2017. According to the report, the Privacy Shield con-
tinues to ensure an adequate level of protection for the personal data trans-
ferred from the EU to participating companies in the United States.29 The
report confirms the United States has the necessary structures and proce-
dures in place to ensure proper functioning of the Privacy Shield, including
options for redress.30 It does, however, offer several recommendations to
ensure the Privacy Shield’s continued success, including:
• “More proactive and regular monitoring of companies’ compliance with
their Privacy Shield obligations by the U.S. Department of Commerce.
The U.S. Department of Commerce should also conduct regular searches
for companies making false claims about their participation in the Pri-
vacy Shield.”31
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• “More awareness-raising for EU individuals about how to exercise their
rights under the Privacy Shield, notably on how to lodge complaints.”32
• “Closer cooperation between privacy enforcers, i.e. the U.S. Department
of Commerce, the Federal Trade Commission, and the EU Data Protec-
tion Authorities (DPAs), notably to develop guidance for companies and
enforcers.”33
• “Enshrining the protection for non-Americans offered by Presidential
Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28), as part of the ongoing debate in the U.S.
on the reauthorization and reform of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act (FISA).”34
• “To appoint as soon as possible a permanent Privacy Shield Ombudsper-
son, as well as ensuring the empty posts are filled on the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB).”35
The WP29 also conducted a review of the Privacy Shield in November
2017,36 and outlined many of the same concerns, prioritizing the nomina-
tion of PCLOB members and of a Privacy Shield Ombudsperson, as well as
legal protections for the privacy of EU citizens in U.S. law and demanding
that they be “resolved” by May 25, 2018, when the GDPR enters into force.
Thus, despite the relatively positive review of the Privacy Shield, concerns
and uncertainty remain as the GDPR’s enforcement date approaches.
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The first version of what would become the GDPR was released by the
European Commission on January 25, 2012,37 as a proposal designed to put
“individuals in control of their own data and reinforce legal and practical
certainty for economic operators and public authorities.”38 The goal of
the GDPR is to work toward a Digital Single Market by harmonizing and
strengthening data privacy laws across Europe, thereby reshaping the way
organizations across the region (and beyond) approach data privacy.39
Arguably, the most significant aspect of the GDPR is that it also applies
to any company that handles the data of EU residents, wherever they are
located:40
[The GDPR] will apply to the processing of personal data by controllers
and processors in the EU, regardless of whether the processing takes place
in the EU or not. The GDPR will also apply to the processing of personal
data of data subjects in the EU by a controller or processor not established
in the EU, where the activities relate to: offering goods and services to EU
citizens (irrespective of whether payment is required) and the monitoring of
behavior that takes place within the EU. Non-EU businesses processing the
data of EU citizens will also have to appoint a representative in the EU.
Moreover, the fact that the GDPR is a regulation makes it immediately
binding upon all Member States in its entirety. This stands in contrast
to its predecessor, the Data Protection Directive, which had to be imple-
mented separately by Member States. The GDPR will enter in force on
May 25, 2018.41
Data Collection Model and
Requirements
The GDPR does not, of course, simply prohibit the collection or use of
individuals’ data by companies. While the general model for data collec-
tion under the GDPR can be broadly construed as “informed consent,” the
GDPR spells out in substantial detail how (and when) consent must be
obtained, and places important limits on how personal data can be stored
and transferred. Likewise, the GDPR requires certain companies to appoint
Data Protection Officers (DPOs), specific individuals who are responsi-
ble for ensuring and demonstrating compliance. In addition, it provides
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concrete avenues for individuals to file complaints about data misuse, and
outlines the procedures by which such complaints will be evaluated and
resolved.
Though the GDPR expands on many of the provisions of the Data Pro-
tection Directive, it also adds many new rules and concepts, including
principles governing the processing of personal data, new rights
for data subjects, more obligations for data controllers and pro-
cessors, and provisions regarding redress.
Principles governing the processing of personal data
• Accountability: the GDPR provides that “the controller shall be re-
sponsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance with [the principles
related to processing of personal data]” (GDPR, 5).vi The designation
of a Data Protection Officer, the conduct of audits, or the publication of
Data Protection Impact Assessments for the most sensitive information
all go toward this principle of accountability.
• Child protection: the GDPR includes the necessity to receive autho-
rization from “the holder of parental responsibility over the child,” when
the child is below sixteen years old—or thirteen years old in certain ju-
risdictions (GDPR, 8).
Rights of the data subject
• User interface: the information related to data processing should be
“concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear
and plain language” (GDPR, 12).
• Right to erasure: the GDPR includes a right to “obtain from the
controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without
undue delay” (GDPR, 17).
• Data portability: the GDPR includes a right to “receive the personal
data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller,
in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and have
the right to transmit those data to another controller without hindrance
vi. Throughout this report, we reference articles of the GDPR as follows: (GDPR,
article number [section number, if applicable]).
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from the controller to which the personal data have been provided”
(GDPR, 20).
• Automated decision-making opt-out: the GDPR includes a right
“not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing,
including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or
similarly significantly affects him or her” (GDPR, 22).
Obligations for data controllers and processors
• Privacy by design: the GDPR provides that data protection should
be protected by design (“implement appropriate technical and orga-
nizational measures, such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to
implement data-protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an
effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the pro-
cessing”) and by default (“only personal data which are necessary for
each specific purpose of the processing are processed. (. . .) In partic-
ular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not
made accessible without the individual’s intervention to an indefinite
number of natural persons” (GDPR, 25).
• Data breach notification: the GDPR provides that “the controller
shall without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours
after having become aware of it, notify the personal data breach to the
supervisory authority. (. . .) Where the notification to the supervisory
authority is not made within 72 hours, it shall be accompanied by rea-
sons for the delay” (GDPR, 33).
Provisions for redress
• Compensation and liability: the GDPR gives “any person who has
suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an infringement
of this Regulation (. . .) the right to receive compensation from the
controller or processor for the damage suffered,” under the following
conditions:
– “Any controller involved in processing shall be liable for the damage
caused by processing which infringes this Regulation.”
– “A processor shall be liable for the damage caused by processing
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only where it has not complied with obligations of this Regulation
specifically directed to processors or where it has acted outside or
contrary to lawful instructions of the controller” (GDPR, 82).
Changes in Enforcement Mechanisms
As with the Data Protection Directive, the key actors for the enforcement
of the GDPR are the national Data Protection Authorities (DPAs), which
have significantly more power than they did previously. For example, un-
der the GDPR, DPAs can levy fines of up to twenty million euros or four
percent of annual global turnover, whichever is higher. Previously, na-
tional DPAs like the French CNIL were only able to levy a maximum fine of
300,000 euros.
Classes of administrative fines
The GDPR also creates two categories of administrative fines. Depending
on “the nature, gravity and duration” of the infringement, its “intentional
or negligent character,” any “action taken by the controller or processor to
mitigate the damage suffered,” as well as the “degree of cooperation with
the supervisory authority,” and whether notification was done properly, the
GDPR outlines two tiers of penalty:
1. The first tier can be subject to fines up to “10 000 000 EUR, or (. . .)
up to two percent of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preced-
ing financial year, whichever is higher.” This category includes infringe-
ments of the following provisions by the controller and the processor:
• Child’s consent
• Data protection by design and by default
• The responsibilities of the Data Protection Officer
• The obligations of organizations related to certification schemes
2. The second tier can be subject to fines up to “20 000 000 EUR, or
(. . .) up to four percent of the total worldwide annual turnover of the
preceding financial year, whichever is higher.” This category includes
infringements of the following provisions by the controller and the pro-
cessor:
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• The basic principles for lawful processing of personal data, including
conditions for consent and the provisions for special categories of
personal data
• The rights of the data subject, as defined in the Regulation
• The obligations in the case of an international transfer of personal
data
• In the case of non-compliance with an order by a DPA to suspend
processings of personal data or data flows, as well as a failure to pro-
vide access to all information required by the DPAs, including access
to the premises and equipments
Lead supervisory authorities
The GDPR also creates a “lead supervisory authority” for every organi-
zation established in the EU, which corresponds to the country where the
organization has its main establishment (in most cases, its headquarters).vii
While data subjects will be able to file complaints in their own Member
State (as well as States where they work or suspect the infringement oc-
curred), the lead supervisory authority of the company will always have
the option of ruling, or delegating to the non-lead authority where the
complaint was filed. This gives companies a “one-stop shop” for data pro-
tection issues, while giving the citizens the option to file their complaints
in their home country. DPAs will also be able to pursue infringement ac-
tions on their own accord. Organizations subject to the GDPR that do not,
however, have an EU establishment will be required to deal with the super-
visory authority of any member state in which a complaint is filed. A full
map of the complaint process follows.42
vii. The WP29 released guidelines on how to determine a company’s lead supervisory
authority. Notably, there is an incentive to set up an establishment in the EU because
this then triggers the “one-stop shop” system. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party,
“Guidelines for Identifying a Controller or Processor’s Lead Supervisory Authority,”
December 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/
2016-51/wp244_en_40857.pdf
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No one in the news business needs to be told that nearly everything
about the process of producing, distributing, and funding journalism has
changed dramatically over the past twenty years. Yet arguably one of the
most challenging aspects of the digital transformation has been its impact
on the advertising ecosystem, and on publishers’ roles within it.
In a print-dominated journalism landscape, publishers were a requisite
intermediary in the two-sided market between advertisers and consumers:
publishers gathered readership and advertisers paid to reach these audi-
ences. In addition to providing a channel for advertising, however, in a
print-based world publishers had an effective monopoly on the data about
their readers, as well as on the access to them. Through subscription data
and direct surveys, publishers collected and controlled the vast majority of
reader data, which, combined with the relatively limited amount of avail-
able ad “real estate” available in print publications, created a premium
market for advertising alongside traditional journalism. The rise of the web,
of course, broke these models in multiple ways.
As speciality sites rose to prominence (Craigslist being an oft-cited ex-
ample), they siphoned off standing streams of revenue that had demanded
little investment or ongoing development from publishers. In mid-2003,
the constraints on available ad space were shattered by the launch of both
WordPress and Google’s AdSense43—the former making organized, visually
appealing web publishing accessible to non-programmers at little or no cost,
and the latter allowing even small websites to place contextual advertising
alongside their content.viii For the first time, advertisers were able to reach
audiences without going through media publishers.
Moreover, with the 2005 launch of Google Analytics44 and its subsequent
purchase of DoubleClick in 2008,45 publishers’ control over audience data
also began to erode. This process was accelerated by the launch of Face-
book Marketplace (2009) and even by organizations like BuzzFeed, which
in 2010 made its “viral dashboard” available to other publishers (including
partners like Time, Fox News, and Huffington Post46) in exchange for their
viii. Prior to this, automated contextual advertising was only available to sites
with greater than twenty million unique visitors per month. See Various authors,
“Google AdSense Launched Today,” Webmaster World.com, June 2003, https://www.
webmasterworld.com/forum89/14.htm.
Tow Center for Digital Journalism
30 GDPR for Global Publishers
organizations’ audience data. With these, the intermediary function that
publishers played as data brokers between advertisers and audiences was
lost. As the CEO of one online data-brokerage site told Julia Angwin at
The Wall Street Journal in 2010, “Advertisers want to buy access to people,
not Web pages.”47
Today, it is difficult for publishers to compete with advertising networks
on the market for online advertising because they control only a fraction of
both the advertising space and their audience data. The result is that there
are essentially four players in the internet data and advertising ecosystem:
1. Platforms (such as Google and Facebook), which collect both original
data provided directly by consumers (in the form of shares, web searches,
and the like) in addition to operating advertising networks
2. Ad networks, which typically collect incidental data (e.g., web-browsing
activity) and place ads
3. Advertisers, which collect little data and rely on both ad networks and
platforms to conduct data-collection and targeting on their behalf
4. Publishers, which create and host content where ads are servedix
While arguments about platform versus publisher designations surely
abound,48 49 50 the GDPR defines actors’ responsibilities under the regu-
lation not by these categories, but by their role in handling personal data:
either as “controllers” or as “processors.” In short, data controllers (of
which there may be more than one) determine why data is being collected,
while data processors are only in charge of the processing. Crucially for
media organizations, data controllers are in charge of ensuring that data
processors abide by the consent of users throughout the data life-cycle.
This is a new responsibility that publishers will have to adopt: they will be
in charge of ensuring that every organization processing data collected on
their website does so for purposes compatible with the purposes for which it
was collected.
ix. This is necessarily a simplification. Publishers may, for example, buy ads on plat-
forms, which now actually control the vast majority of available ad space. As we will
elaborate, however, this may actually complicate their situation under the GDPR.
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An overview of the resource flows among key players in the online economy.
Who is a ‘controller’? Who is a ‘processor’?
According to the GDPR a “controller” is:
the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which,
alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data (GDPR, 4 [7]).
By contrast, a “processor” is:
a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which
processes personal data on behalf of the controller (GDPR, 4 [8]).
Given the above definitions, of course, whether a particular organization is
a controller or a processor in a given situation is not always obvious—and
in certain situations a single organization may be a controller, a processor,
or both, depending on the particular data collected and how it is used. For
example:
Case 1: Direct marketing/in-house ads
If a news organization collects personal information from subscribers
that is then processed by the marketing team for sales purposes, the news
organization would be both controller (i.e., the party deciding what gets
Tow Center for Digital Journalism
32 GDPR for Global Publishers
collected and how it is used) and the processor (because it is also doing the
analysis in-house).
Case 2: Publishers contract third-party services
For example, if a news organization uses third-party services such as
MailChimp to manage and send a newsletter, MailChimp would be a pro-
cessor, since its services involve hosting, accessing, and querying data that
the news organization (the controller) has decided to collect and use.
Case 3: Publishers sell ad space on their websites
In many cases, news organizations host third-party content (such as
digital advertisements) that collects data about visitors. Although in some
ways it is the ad network that “determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data,” in this circumstance the news organization is
at least one controller of the data because it technically has the option of
not providing any data to the ad network, though clearly at the cost of ad
revenue. In most of these cases, however, the ad network itself is also both
a controller and a processor. As a result, news organizations and digital ad
networks may often be joint controllers (GDPR, 26).
In almost every circumstance, then, news organizations are at least data
controllers, if not also data processors. What this means is that news orga-
nizations that target content or services to EU residents will need to plan
carefully how they collect, handle, and share any information about their
readers. Given news organizations’ direct relationships with their readers,
we posit that well-prepared news organizations may actually benefit from
the GDPR, especially relative to other actors in the space.
Impact on Platforms, News
Organizations, and Ad Networks
Platforms (e.g., Google, Facebook)
Arguably, the GDPR will have the largest impact on platforms, for whom
the rules requiring that consent be freely given “by a clear affirmative act”
(GDPR, 32) and limits on “further processing” of data may reduce their
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ability to accumulate long-term profiles about individuals, as well as use
what data they do have for ancillary purposes.
This is particularly likely given the very specific way in which the GDPR
determines whether consent is, in fact, freely given. Specifically, the regu-
lation states that consent is not “freely given” if “the data subject has no
genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without
detriment” (GDPR, 42). Similarly, the regulation does not view consent as
“freely given” if “the provision of a service . . . is conditional on consent to
the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance
of that contract” (GDPR, 7 [4]). Thus, any “free” app or service that is, in
fact, monetized through the use or resale of personal data (especially un-
related to the specific service being provided) will only be successful to the
extent that it can persuade users to actively consent to such uses.x
Further complicating the landscape for large platforms in particular are
the logistical challenges posed by the GDPR’s “right to access” provisions,
which give data subjects far-reaching rights around the personal data held
about them by companies. For example, the GDPR specifies that data sub-
jects have the right to an electronic method for requesting, free of charge,
“access to and rectification or erasure of personal data” (GDPR, 59). The
regulation then goes on to specify that these requests should be fulfilled
“without undue delay,” but more specifically, “within one month” (GDPR,
59).
These provisions may raise particular challenges for companies that ag-
gregate data for the purposes of analysis, during which a direct connection
between the data subject and the data itself may, under current systems,
no longer be explicitly maintained. In fact, such processes help comply with
the GDPR’s mandate for “privacy by design” (GDPR, 78; GDPR, 25).
Yet removing explicit identifiers (such as name, address, handle, or user
ID, etc.) may also not be enough to ensure that aggregated data is no
x. This interpretation of “freely given” consent differs substantially from the prevailing
notion that when consumers consent to the processing of their personal data, it is be-
cause they believe they derive sufficient benefit. Recent research (Joseph Turow, Michael
Hennessy, and Nora A Draper, “The Tradeoff Fallacy: How Marketers Are Misrepresent-
ing American Consumers and Opening Them Up to Exploitation,” 2015 ) suggests that
the consumer behavior may be better explained by “resignation” due to their inability to
control their information.
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longer considered “personal data” under the GDPR, which treats as per-
sonal data “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person” (GDPR, 4). As both substantial reporting and academic research
have shown, truly de-identifying data is not a simple task. For example,
in 2000, Harvard professor Latanya Sweeney demonstrated that eighty-
seven percent of the U.S. population could be uniquely identified using a
combination of their gender, birth date, and five-digit zip code; in 2006,
researchers Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov demonstrated that the
“Netflix prize” dataset could be used to identify individual users, despite
the removal of identifying information.51 52 53 In the decade since, thanks
in part to the volume and prevalence of online information, the ability to
re-identify individuals using data that has no explicit identifiers has only
grown, and has been frequently highlighted in the press using data sets like
taxi rides54 55 56 and online browsing histories,57 among others.xi
This raises the question of whether the GDPR’s right to erasure and
correction will require companies to maintain these links in some form or
simply discard data more promptly. Either way, these regulations imply
serious technical and business-practice overhauls that are likely to be felt
more acutely by companies whose business models are built on large-scale
data collection and analysis.
News organizations
Although news organizations do collect and process personal data, the
majority of GDPR-relevant personal data collection by news organizations
is done via their websites or apps for advertising purposes—and this data
is often not retained by the news organization itself. However, since, as we
xi. Though no de-identification system is perfect, methods like k-anonymity (Latanya
Sweeney, “k-anonymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy,” International Journal of
Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems 10, no. 5 (2002): 557–570 ), l-
diversity (Ashwin Machanavajjhala et al., “l-diversity: Privacy Beyond k-anonymity,”
in Data Engineering, 2006. ICDE’06. Proceedings of the 22nd International Confer-
ence on (IEEE, 2006), 24–24 ), differential privacy (Cynthia Dwork, “Differential Pri-
vacy: A Survey of Results,” in International Conference on Theory and Applications of
Models of Computation (Springer, 2008), 1–19 ), and others can help reduce the iden-
tifiability of data that is collected, while still allowing meaningful analysis to be done
on the data. An interesting example of this in the online browsing space is Panopticlick
(https://panopticlick.eff.org/), a project from EFF.
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explained, news organization are at minimum a “joint controller” of such
data, they will be responsible both for obtaining consent from data subjects
and for ensuring that the data handling processes of any vendors with
whom they contract (e.g., online advertising networks) are compliant with
the regulation. To the extent that news organizations do collect and store
such information for internal purposes, of course, they will be responsible
for its proper processing as well.
On the one hand, these requirements suggest significant new burdens for
news organizations that may not currently have well-defined processes or
oversight for the handling of such data. For example, many news organiza-
tions may not even have a comprehensive inventory of all of the companies
that are collecting personal data on their websites and what those compa-
nies are doing with that data. As one editor from Le Monde told us: “On
any page, you’ll find between five and fifteen ad trackers and you try to find
out . . . what they’re collecting and what they’re doing with the data . . .
And some of them just don’t say.”
Indeed, recent research indicates that perhaps most website owners do—
and potentially cannot—effectively audit the trackers and other materials
that are loaded on their sites. A recent post from Princeton researcher
Arvind Narayanan and his colleagues detailed which websites may poten-
tially host “session replay scripts,”58 which record user interactions on
websites as if they were “looking over your shoulder.” Among the sites that
may load such services are realclearpolitics.com, cbsnews.com, and others.
In addition to being able to capture data like passwords and other personal
information,59 these scripts often cannot be effectively detected by
site owners.60 Under the GDPR, news organizations will be responsible
for ensuring that any third-party scripts or advertisements loaded by their
pages comply with the regulation’s requirements, or risk liability for the
mishandling of audience data, essentially putting a due diligence require-
ment on website owners to “clean their websites” and make sure that no
third parties are tracking users, with or without the owners’ knowledge.
One particular topic of concern is that the GDPR requires that consent
be obtained from site visitors before any data is collected about them.
If enforced strictly, news organizations may have to rethink the timing
and placement of advertisements and other scripts on some of the most
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valuable ad real estate they have: the homepage. In conversations with
the CNIL (the French DPA), for example, Le Monde editors said they
were struggling to devise a plan for their homepage that would satisfy the
regulation without cutting homepage traffic and ad revenue off at the knees.
While many European sites currently use small pop-up notices to inform
readers that a site uses cookies (as part of their compliance with the Data
Privacy Directive), the CNIL has indicated that this may not qualify as
genuine “consent” under the GDPR, since some ads may be loaded (and
data collected) before the required consent click has taken place. As a
result, a more radical solution, such as a “roadblock” consent agreement or
“splash page” for new users, might be required. However, as a Le Monde
editor described it:
Basically, [a splash page is] what CNIL would like all of us to do because
in their—in their opinion, [it’s] the only way to make sure that the proper
consent is given. And, of course, no French editor wants to do this because
you know that if you do that you’ll have fifteen or maybe twenty percent of
your traffic that will disappear.
Moreover, it’s unclear as yet whether consent to data-collection can be
made the “price of access” to a site; while the European IAB has inter-
preted the GDPR as allowing this,61 other organizations disagree.62 Re-
gardless, publishers who are already reluctant to put up paywalls may be
understandably hesitant to demand that users consent to tracking instead.
Either way, the risk to homepage ad revenue could be serious, especially
given the importance of those ads to publishers’ revenue streams. As a Le
Monde editor put it: “[Homepage ads are] the ones you sell at the highest
price. You can’t cut them unless you’re willing to take [something like a]
forty percent drop in your ad revenue.”
Yet as tricky as GDPR compliance will be, compared to other businesses
news organizations may, on balance, actually gain from the new regulation.
Because all organizations will need to obtain consent in order to collect
data, the direct and trusted relationship with consumers that news orga-
nizations have (or can repair) may help them obtain this consent more
readily, giving them a valuable edge over ad networks that lack name recog-
nition, or even large platforms about whom users may be conflicted.
Chris Pedigo, a senior vice president for Digital Content Next—a trade
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organization for digital content companies including the Associated Press,
Bloomberg, the Financial Times, Hearst, and The Washington Post—
believes that media companies will be in a favorable position, especially as
compared to their platform and ad network counterparts:
Think about, you know, a publisher like The New York Times. They tend
to want to know more about their audience so that they can see how they
use the site, so they can recommend other articles that they might be
interested in, remember a customer when they come back . . . [but] that’s
the sort of extent of it . . . But even if you had to go to a customer and
say, you know, “Hey, we would like consent to track you while you’re on our
site so we can recommend other articles for you, so that we can remember
you when you come back to visit us,” most—most people are going to say
that’s fine. They get that relationship with The New York Times.
By contrast, said Pedigo, platform companies like Google and Face-
book will have a harder time getting consumers’ consent under the GDPR
because “they’ll have to list out all the reasons that they want to track
the consumer.” Many of these reasons may include the types of activities
that consumers feel are simply an invasion of privacy,63 making them less
likely to agree. Moreover, given the limited revenue that publishers actu-
ally garner from these platforms,64 publishers may choose to hold on to the
audience data they do collect, and attempt to strike more favorable terms
than they currently provide.
An editor at The Guardian shared a similar view, saying, “I think some
publishers are more positive than others about the impact that the GDPR
will have because, in theory, you just have more trust in news brand web-
sites than . . . any other websites.”
Advertisers
Perhaps the sector that will face the most challenges under the GDPR will
be the third-party ad networks that are not already part of one of the large
platform companies (e.g., Google, Facebook). As of 2017, Google and Face-
book claim seventy-seven cents of every dollar spent on digital advertising
in the United States, with no other single company claiming even as much
as three percent of the total market share.65 While the GDPR may hin-
der some of these companies’ data collection and/or sharing activities, the
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regulation may well squeeze smaller advertising networks even more, po-
tentially magnifying the dominance of this duopoly in online advertising.
These smaller ad networks, for example, typically lack the direct consumer
relationships needed to secure consent from users on their own behalf, but
may also find that media publishers and other website hosts are reluctant
to ask for user consent for the broad range and volume of data that these
advertisers can presently access without hindrance. Without access to the
data on which they currently rely, smaller advertising networks may be sim-
ply cut out of the online market altogether unless they can find a way to
gain some advantage over the platforms in compliance, user-friendliness, or
rates. In this environment, platform companies and website hosts—such as
media companies—that have a brand-name relationship to their users are
likely to have more success in persuading individuals to give up their infor-
mation, and therefore may have increased power in the advertising market
under the GDPR.
Other Concerns for News
Organizations
While the impact of the GDPR on both business processes and revenue
streams is understandably the focus for many companies, the impact for
news organizations which rely on information gathered about people to do
their work may have other ramifications.
Journalistic data gathering and retention
While the GDPR does explicitly note that exemptions should be made for
data processed “solely for journalistic purposes,” and that it is essential to
interpret artistic, academic, and journalistic activities “broadly” (GDPR,
153), some journalists are still concerned about the impact that data sub-
jects’ right to erasure, for example, may pose to newsgathering. As one
Guardian editor put it: “I think from a journalism perspective, if you had
to get rid of data that you processed after a certain amount of time, you
[might] lose . . . long-term investigations.”
Although the GDPR does provide a “public interest exception” when
it comes to the removal and erasure of information, it explicitly stipulates
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this only in the case of official documents.xii Instead, the GDPR specifies
exemptions on any data processing required “for exercising the right of
freedom of expression and information” (GDPR, 17 [3]), but these are left
up to the Member States to define and implement (GDPR, 153). Thus,
there is the possibility for uneven interpretations of these exemptions from
country to country.
The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’
When the “Right to be Forgotten” (RTBF) was established in Europe in
March 2014, many in the news industry feared that the result would have
a chilling effect on both news gathering and publishing.66 Yet in the three
years since it was enacted, research suggests that the impact of the Right
to Be Forgotten on access to news information has, in fact, been minimal.67
Though the GDPR unsurprisingly enshrines this right, it also modifies
the methods of redress in ways that some experts fear may ultimately be
problematic for freedom of expression.
In the landmark RTBF case, Google Spain v. AEPD and Mario Costeja
González, the courts rejected the idea that the news publisher should be
forced to take down content.68 Google was, however, ultimately forced to
remove links to the specified material in some of its search results. With
the increased penalties imposed by the GDPR for failing to delist content
in a timely way, some scholars fear that digital intermediaries (such as so-
cial media sites) will be too quick to comply with removal requests once
the GDPR is in effect, which may chill online speech by placing liability
concerns—and stiff financial repercussions—ahead of the freedom of infor-
mation and expression rights of other parties that might be affected.
As Daphne Keller, director of Intermediary Liability at the Stanford
Center for Internet and Society, explains in her recent paper, “The Right
Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the 2016 General Data
Protection Regulation”: “Even Data Protection experts can’t say for sure
how the GDPR answers hugely consequential questions, like whether host-
ing platforms must carry out RTBF removals.”69
xii. “Public access to official documents may be considered to be in the public interest”
(GDPR, 154).
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Keller also points out that different interpretations exist as to whether
hosts like Facebook or Twitter are, indeed, engaging in the kind of data
indexing and “profiling” described in the Google Spain case, which was the
foundation of the order requiring Google to delist content. As Keller notes,
however:
Another possible interpretation is that hosts trigger RTBF obligations when
they let users search hosted content for names, generating a search result
“profile” based on content stored on the host’s servers. If that were correct,
and if Twitter were a Controller, it would not have to delete my tweet
about Matilda Humperdink—but it might have to delist it from results in
the Twitter’s search box.
Keller thus highlights an important issue that may arise: the path of
least resistance for content hosts would be to avoid both fines and addi-
tional scrutiny by removing reported material “inconspicuously, without
acknowledging any Controller status or legal obligation, [and] by classing
the removal as voluntary.” An obvious potential consequence of this is that
even valid content may be hidden from view, even in cases where the com-
plaints themselves are substantially invalid.
However, while delisting does make it harder to access this content, the
WP29 guidelines on the implementation of this RTBF clearly state that
“the original information will still be accessible using other search terms
[that the data subject’s name], or by direct access to the publisher’s original
source,”70 which reduces the impact of systematic removal by content hosts.
Keller also addresses a second potential issue: a threat to freedom of
expression. She argues that relying on the existing Intermediary Liability
laws under the eCommerce Directive for notice-and-takedown and absolving
content hosts of any Right to be Forgotten obligations would be effective
in mitigating the risks that the GDPR currently poses to freedom of ex-
pression.xiii While the RTBF clearly has not had the impact on freedom
of expression that some of its opponents thought it would, it is currently
unclear how some GDPR provisions will be interpreted and enforced.
In this respect, despite its nature as a Regulation and not a Directive,
the GDPR relies on DPAs for enforcement. While the network of DPAs has
xiii. Read more about liability of online intermediaries here: http://ec.europa.eu/
information_society/newsroom/cf/document.cfm?doc_id=835
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been preparing to cooperate and coordinate post-May 25, 2018, logistical
challenges still remain. The road to EU-wide consistent enforcement of the
GDPR is uncertain.
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Understanding Scope
Who is affected?
As noted throughout this report, the GDPR applies to all organizations of-
fering “goods and services” to individuals in Europe, regardless of whether
or not the service requires payment (GDPR, 23), or whether the organi-
zation has a physical presence in the EU. At the same time, the fact that
a website or service is available to EU residents is insufficient to trigger
governance by the GDPR:
The mere accessibility of the controller’s, processor’s or an intermediary’s
website in the Union, of an email address or of other contact details, or the
use of a language generally used in the third country where the controller is
established, is insufficient to ascertain [applicability]; factors such as the use
of a language or a currency generally used in one or more Member States
with the possibility of ordering goods and services in that other language,
or the mentioning of customers or users who are in the Union, may make
it apparent that the controller envisages offering goods or services to data
subjects in the Union (GDPR, 23).
In other words, virtually any media organization with content directed
toward European audiences might be considered liable for enforcement
under the GDPR, especially if subscriptions are offered within the EU
(whether or not a subscription requires payment, or is mandatory for access
to all content).
Who can complain?
As illustrated in Figure 1, there are actually multiple parties that can file
a complaint under the GDPR. In addition to an individual whose data is
being collected (the “data subject”), supervisory authorities can initiate
complaints as well. Moreover, the GDPR does allow for a kind of “class
action” suit, in which a data subject may:
mandate a not-for-profit body, organisation or association . . . to lodge a
complaint on his or her behalf with a supervisory authority, [and] exercise
the right to a judicial remedy on behalf of data subjects or, if provided for
in Member State law, exercise the right to receive compensation on behalf
of data subjects (GDPR, 142).
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How to Comply
Obtaining consent
While the GDPR does not specify particular mechanisms for obtaining
consent, the regulation stipulates that consent must be obtained before any
data is collected. As previously noted, in practical terms this may mean
requiring a splash page for organizations that have ads on the homepage,
or delaying the display of ads until consent has been obtained. While it is
not yet clear whether such extreme measures will be required, it is worth
noting that the notion of consent under the GDPR is far broader and more
nuanced than U.S. organizations might expect.
For example, the regulation requires that:
Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely
given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s
agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her (GDPR,
32)
While this may seem straightforward enough, the regulation is extremely
particular about what constitutes “freely given” consent. For example:
Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no
genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without
detriment (GDPR, 42).
Finally, it states:
When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be
taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the
provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal
data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract (GDPR, 7
[4]).
In other words, the GDPR puts significant limits on the ability of compa-
nies to collect data from users that is not directly related to the provision
of the service being offered—a regular practice of many apps.71 72 73 74
The regulation also describes the manner in which consent must be
obtained. Given that most people do not read privacy policies75 (perhaps
because they do not have time76), the regulation stipulates that:
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The request for consent shall be presented in a manner which is clearly dis-
tinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible
form, using clear and plain language. Any part of such a declaration which
constitutes an infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding (GDPR,
7 [2]).
In other words, requests for consent cannot be obfuscated within “long
illegible terms and conditions full of legalese.”77
Withdrawing consent
Embedded within the consent provisions of the GDPR is the requirement
that just as companies must obtain consent to collect data, they must
provide an equally easy method for withdrawing consent:
The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any
time . . . It shall be as easy to withdraw consent as to give it (GDPR, 7
[3]).
Yet while withdrawal of consent does not “affect the lawfulness of process-
ing based on consent before its withdrawal” (GDPR, 7 [3]):
a data subject should have the right to have his or her personal data erased
and no longer processed where . . . a data subject has withdrawn his or her
consent (GDPR, 65).
From a data management perspective, this requirement presents a funda-
mental departure from prior practice, especially in the United States. For
example, when the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) revised the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Rule (COPPA) in 2012, it explicitly exempted
from the (then) newly introduced parental consent requirements any data
(including images or videos of children, or audio of their voices) collected
before the rule went into effect on July 1, 2013.78 Under the GDPR, once
a user has withdrawn consent, no further processing of their data may take
place, even if collected prior to the withdrawal, which might force compa-
nies to audit their data centers for such data.
The potential technical challenges to complying with the consent with-
drawal process, moreover, are significant. As previously discussed, the as-
sociation between a given piece of data and the person to whom it pertains
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may not be maintained in many existing data storage systems, and relying
on the removal of explicit identifiers to maintain privacy may be materi-
ally insufficient under the GDPR. Given that the GDPR considers personal
data to be any data which “could be attributed to a natural person [in-
cluding] by the use of additional information” (GDPR, 26), the impact on
technical systems that are not designed to easily identify and erase the data
of a particular individual could be significant.
This is even truer for larger systems, where backup copies of data may
be kept in multiple locations (including “cold” backups in offsite ware-
houses) in order to protect against power loss, data corruption, or simply to
improve system performance. For the managers of such systems, the imper-
ative to both withdraw consent and allow “erasure” (discussed in the next
section) has far-reaching business implications.
Handling Breaches, Access, Erasure,
and Portability
In addition to the broad scope of the organizations and data types that are
governed by the GDPR, the regulation provides detailed stipulations about
how data must be handled once it has been collected.
Breaches
According to the GDPR, a personal data breach constitutes:
a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss,
alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmit-
ted, stored or otherwise processed (GDPR, 4 [12]).
Given the relatively broad definition of personal data under the GDPR,
these breach notification requirements apply to a much greater volume of
incidents than in the United States. For example, though breach notifi-
cation laws vary from state to state, they often apply only to data that
contains some kind of account or ID number, such as driver’s license, credit
card, debit card or social security number, or data that permits access to
accounts (such as passwords and security questions).79
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The GDPR also places much more stringent time requirements on no-
tifying both authorities and consumers about personal data breaches. In
any case where a breach is deemed to pose “a risk for the rights and free-
doms of individuals,”80 the notification must be made within seventy-two
hours of its discovery, unless “early disclosure could unnecessarily hamper
the investigation of the circumstances of a personal data breach” (GDPR,
88). By contrast, only a handful of U.S. states even specify a time frame,
with those that do allowing from thirty to ninety days.81 To cite a recent
example, Uber’s disclosure of a data breach more than a year after it took
place would almost certainly be a violation of the GDPR and would leave
the company open to hefty fines.82
Right to access, data portability, and transfer
In line with the right to withdraw consent, the GDPR also stipulates that
data subjects be given the right to access and, where applicable, correct any
data held about them:
Modalities should be provided . . . to request and, if applicable, obtain, free
of charge, in particular, access to and rectification or erasure of personal
data and the exercise of the right to object (GDPR, 59).
Moreover, an electronic means for making these requests must be provided,
and:
The controller should be obliged to respond to requests from the data
subject without undue delay and at the latest within one month (GDPR,
59).
In addition to being able to access and correct their data via electronic
means, under the GDPR data subjects must also be able to retrieve any
data that is processed via “automated means” in a “structured, commonly
used, machine-readable and interoperable format” (GDPR, 68). Moreover:
The data subject shall . . . have the right to transmit those data to another
controller without hindrance from the [original] controller . . . the data
subject shall have the right to have the personal data transmitted directly
from one controller to another, where technically feasible (GDPR, 20 [1–2]).
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To support this, the GDPR encourages the development of such “inter-
operable formats,” but little guidance is offered as to how this should be
approached.
Right of erasure/Right to Be Forgotten
The GDPR also uses “Right to Be Forgotten” language to describe its
erasure stance, which requires that individuals be given:
the right to erasure should also be extended in such a way that a controller
who has made the personal data public should be obliged to inform the
controllers which are processing such personal data to erase any links to, or
copies or replications of those personal data (GDPR, 66).
Importantly, this “informing” of other controllers may also explicitly in-
clude “technical measures” (GDPR, 17 [2]), such as automated notification
or, presumably, programmatic flags or notices.
Demonstrating Compliance
There is, of course, no one-size-fits-all solution to GDPR compliance. It
would be unrealistic to suggest that compliance requires less than a com-
prehensive examination of an organization’s data collection, handling,
storage, and retention practices. For organizations whose data-analysis
activities are large-scale and central to their business (read: platforms com-
panies, though media companies that do significant data analysis and cross-
targeting might potentially qualify), the GDPR requires the appointment
of a Data Protection Officer (DPO) who must be provided with sufficient
access, independence, and resources to monitor and ensure compliance with
the GDPR within the company.xiv Crucially, in its accountability provision,
the GDPR stipulates that controllers need to be “demonstrably compliant”
with the law (GDPR 5 [2]).
For other organizations, sufficient guidance should be available via the
Data Protection Board, whose composition, authority, and duties are also
laid out in the GDPR.xv
xiv. For details on DPOs, including their qualifications and tasks, see Appendix III.
xv. Similar to the Article 29 Working Party, the Data Protection Board is composed
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Compliance, then, is essentially a matter of identifying the risks to per-
sonal data within an organization and the best practices for mitigating
those risks, followed by the implementation “of approved codes of conduct,
approved certifications, guidelines provided by the Board or indications
provided by the Data Protection Officer” (GDPR, 77). Exactly what those
codes of conduct, certifications, and other guidelines will be remains to be
seen, but organizations would do well to stay aware of the Data Protection
Board’s proceedings on these topics.
Privacy by design
While the current dearth of approved policies and codes of conduct may
seem daunting, documentation of efforts to meet the above-mentioned
requirements with respect to consent and data rights will no doubt play a
role in any evaluation of potential violations, especially in the early days
of the regulation’s enforcement. To support this, the GDPR advocates a
general approach of “privacy by design”—a methodology which stipulates
that privacy considerations be represented at every stage of design and
engineering processes. In the language of the GDPR:
Such measures could consist, inter alia, of minimising the processing of per-
sonal data, pseudonymising personal data as soon as possible, transparency
with regard to the functions and processing of personal data, enabling the
data subject to monitor the data processing, enabling the controller to
create and improve security features (GDPR, 78).
Data minimization, moreover, might include:
technical and organisational measures for ensuring that, by default, only
personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the pro-
cessing are processed . . . In particular, such measures shall ensure that
by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual’s
intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons (GDPR, 25 [2]).
Certification bodies
The Data Protection Board may designate certification bodies that are
authorized to certify specific processes and practices, and may also:
of representatives from each of the Member States, along with a European Commission
representative in a non-voting capacity.
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adopt implementing acts laying down technical standards for certifica-
tion mechanisms and data protection seals and marks, and mechanisms
to promote and recognise those certification mechanisms, seals and marks
(GDPR, 43 [9]).
The criteria for accrediting such certification bodies will be made public
and transparent (GDPR, 43 [6]) by the Data Protection Board.
Deploying New Technologies
Like most regulations, the specifics of the GDPR are designed to address
the data privacy and control issues presented by current technologies. How-
ever, just as data collected before the adoption of the GDPR is not exempt
from its rules (such as the right of erasure or withdrawal of consent), the
regulation stipulates that the impact of new technologies on data rights be
evaluated before they are deployed. Specifically:
Where a type of processing in particular using new technologies . . . is
likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons,
the controller shall, prior to the processing, carry out an assessment of the
impact of the envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal
data (GDPR, 35 [1]).
Though at first glance this may seem like a straightforward requirement,
the reality is that evaluating the privacy implications of a new process is
far from a simple proposition, and identifying privacy-preserving ways to
perform tasks like large-scale computation and data analysis remains an
area of active computer-science research.83 84) While GDPR compliance
may realistically slow the deployment of new data-analysis technologies, it
may simultaneously spur more active research and development in the areas




There is no doubt that GDPR compliance will have a radical impact on
the operations and business practices of any organization that deals with
data about people, which in today’s web-driven environment means virtu-
ally every organization imaginable. While news organizations and media
companies whose work makes them subject to the GDPR will certainly
have some changes to make, the most substantial impact will be felt by
technology platforms and advertising companies, whose cross-purpose data
use and complex user relationships will likely complicate the process of ob-
taining consent for the types of business practices upon which some of their
revenue streams currently depend.
Of course, any fallout for platforms and advertisers will necessarily have
an impact on media companies, many of whom rely on the reach and rev-
enue that these industries provide in order to disseminate and support
their work. Yet on balance, the regulation may ultimately strengthen the
position of news organizations that have strong relationships with their
audiences, and may even partially restore news organizations’ role as in-
termediaries for reader data. This would then allow news organizations to
more selectively (and profitably) share this data with advertisers and/or
platforms companies. Thus, while the direct impact of the GDPR on news
gathering is likely to be minimal, media organizations with European au-
diences would do well to not only prepare themselves to be compliant with
the regulation, but to avoid business decisions that may be profitable in
the short term at the cost of reader trust, clearly a reinforced asset post-
GDPR.
For media companies without a substantial EU audience, of course, the
implications of the GDPR are less clear. Yet while non-EU-facing news or-
ganizations will not have to immediately concern themselves with GDPR
compliance in their own practices, it is unlikely that they will be fully
shielded from the effects of the regulation, especially as it necessarily trans-
forms the practices of platforms and advertisers. In the short term, for
example, non-EU markets may see an increased share of online advertising
dollars, as the complexity of the regulation and concerns about compli-
ance and liability temporarily make less-regulated markets more attractive
for both ad networks and advertisers. As the markets in Europe normal-
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ize, however, news organizations in other regions may experience a set of
longer-term secondary effects.
For example, unless GDPR enforcement produces dramatically negative
economic effects (as was predicted around the Right to Be Forgotten,85 but
has not clearly materialized as argued), it is possible that similar regula-
tions may be imposed in other regions; Brazil, for one, may be headed in
this direction,86 and in September 2017 the UK introduced legislation de-
signed to substantially mirror the protections of the GDPR87 in advance of
Brexit. Given Americans’ increasingly negative attitudes toward third-party
informations sharing (see Pew’s recent work on “Privacy and Information
Sharing,”88) and even some indications from Congress that companies
should be held liable for information collected about consumers,89 it is not
unthinkable that increased data regulation will come to U.S. markets in the
next several years.
More immediately, companies subject to the GDPR must decide whether
they will achieve compliance by building separate, parallel systems and
processes for use in European markets, or whether they will simply convert
all of their business processes to conform to the regulation. Especially for
large, multinational corporations (such as platform and technology compa-
nies) the cost of lost interoperability and maintaining parallel systems may
make a fully compliant approach more cost-effective in the long run. The
result is that their global practices may change substantially, in ways that
all organizations dependent on their services (as so many news organiza-
tions are) will likely feel.
While the GDPR is not the only significant piece of privacy legislation
that will affect publishers in the near future—the ePrivacy Regulation90
provides some complementary detail around cookie use, in particular—
the GDPR will have global impact, as both a test case and a precedent
for increased privacy protection and data collection accountability on the
internet. Fortunately for media companies and their audiences, the net
effect of these regulations may well be positive in the long term, especially
for organizations that cultivate strong reader relationships. Though few
may welcome the new complexities the GDPR promises in the near future,
eventually it may prove a valuable mechanism for helping rebalance the
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• Notice: Organizations must inform individuals about the purposes
for which their information is being collected and used and by whom;
individuals must also be provided with information about who and how
to contact about inquiries or complaints.91
• Choice: Organizations must offer individuals the opportunity to choose
whether their personal information is disclosed to a third party or used
for a purpose that is incompatible with the purpose(s) for which it was
originally collected or subsequently authorized by the individual. No-
tably, for sensitive information, individuals must explicitly opt in when
personal data is to be transferred to a third party or used for a purpose
other than the one for which it was originally collected or subsequently
authorized.92
• Onward transfer: “In transferring information to a third party, orga-
nizations must apply the Notice and Choice Principles. Third parties
acting as agents must provide the same level of privacy protection ei-
ther by subscribing to Safe Harbor, adhering to the Directive or another
adequacy finding, or entering into a contract that specifies equivalent
privacy protections.”93
• Security: “Organizations creating, maintaining, using or disseminating
personal information must take reasonable precautions to protect it
from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and
destruction.”94
• Data Integrity: Personal information must be relevant for the purposes
for which it is to be used. Organizations should take reasonable steps to
ensure that data is reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete, and
current.95
• Access: “Individuals must have access to the information about them
that an organization holds and must be able to correct, amend, or delete
that information where it is inaccurate, except where the burden or ex-
pense would be disproportionate to the risks to the individual’s privacy
or where the rights of others would be violated. Furthermore, the Safe
Harbor principles may be limited to the extent necessary for national
security, public interest, or law enforcement requirements.”96
• Enforcement: “Effective privacy protection must include mechanisms
for verifying compliance, provide readily available and affordable inde-
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pendent recourse mechanisms in cases of noncompliance, and include
remedial measures for the organization when the Principles are not fol-
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• Handling Europeans’ Personal Data: U.S. companies transferring
personal data from the EU must commit to satisfying, robust obligations
regarding how that data is processed. U.S. DOC and FTC will monitor
and enforce these commitments, and any company handling personal
data from the EU must commit to comply with decisions by European
data protection authorities.98
• USG Access to Data: The United States has given the EU written as-
surances that access to information by public authorities for law enforce-
ment and national security purposes will be subject to clear limitations,
safeguards, and oversight mechanisms. There will be an annual joint re-
view conducted by the EC and the DOC to ensure that the agreement is
functioning—and the first annual review was published on October 18,
2017.99
• Redress: Under the agreement, EU citizens who believe that their data
has been misused will have several redress possibilities, and companies
to which complaints are directed will have deadlines to respond to such
complaints. European data protection authorities may refer complaints
to the DOC and the FTC, and for complaints of suspected access to
information by national intelligence authorities in the US, a new om-
budsperson will be created within the U.S. Department of State.100
Companies participating in the Privacy Shield commit to abiding by the
following seven Privacy Principles,101 which expand on the principles laid
out in the Safe Harbor Agreement:
• Notice: This principle provides that “organisations are obliged to pro-
vide information to data subjects on a number of key elements relating
to the processing of their personal data.” Furthermore, organizations
must publicize their privacy policies together with a link to the DOC
website for further information, a “Privacy Shield List” to be drafted,
and a dispute settlement provider.
• Data Integrity and Purpose Limitation: This principle provides
that “personal data must be limited to what is relevant for the purpose
of the processing, reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete and
current.” In particular, personal data can only be retained “for as long
Tow Center for Digital Journalism
64 GDPR for Global Publishers
as it serves the purpose(s) for which it was initially collected or subse-
quently authorised.”
• Choice: This principle provides that, if the purposes are “materially
different from” (but still compatible with) those for which the data was
collected, subjects must be given the choice to opt out.
• Security: This principle provides that organizations must take “rea-
sonable and appropriate” security measures that account for the “risks
involved in the processing and the nature of the data”—and this remains
true when the data is handled by vendors.
• Access: This principle gives data subjects “the right (. . .) to obtain
from an organization confirmation of whether such organization is pro-
cessing personal data related to them and have the data communicated
within reasonable time. Furthermore, denials of this right of access must
be “necessary and duly justified” by the organization rejecting the re-
quest. In addition to mere access, this principle also gives data subjects
the right to “correct, amend, or delete personal information where it is
inaccurate or collected in violation of the Privacy Principles.”
• Recourse, Enforcement, and Liability: This principle forces compa-
nies to provide “robust mechanisms to ensure compliance with the other
Principles and recourse for EU data subjects whose personal data have
been processed in a noncompliant manner, including effective remedies.”
• Accountability for Onward Transfer: This principles provides that
onward transfers can only happen under three conditions: “(i) for limited
and specified purposes, (ii) on the basis of a contract (. . .) and (iii) only
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Controller
“controller” means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or
other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data (GDPR, 4 [7])
Processor
“processor” means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency
or other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller
(GDPR, 4 [8])
Recipient
“recipient” means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or
another body, to which the personal data are disclosed, whether a third
party or not (GDPR, 4 [9])
Data Protection Officers
where, in the private sector, processing is carried out by a controller whose
core activities consist of processing operations that require regular and
systematic monitoring of the data subjects on a large scale, or where the
core activities of the controller or the processor consist of processing on
a large scale of special categories of personal data and data relating to
criminal convictions and offences, a person with expert knowledge of data
protection law and practices should assist the controller or processor to
monitor internal compliance with this Regulation (GDPR, 97)
The core activities of the controller or the processor consist of processing
operations which, by virtue of their nature, their scope and/or their pur-
poses, require regular and systematic monitoring of data subjects on a large
scale (GDPR, 37 [1][b])
The data protection officer may be a staff member of the controller or
processor, or fulfil the tasks on the basis of a service contract (GDPR, 37
[6])
The controller and the processor shall ensure that the data protection
officer is involved, properly and in a timely manner, in all issues which
relate to the protection of personal data (GDPR, 38 [1])
The controller and processor shall support the data protection officer in
performing the tasks referred to in Article 39 by providing resources nec-
essary to carry out those tasks and access to personal data and processing
operations, and to maintain his or her expert knowledge (GDPR, 38 [2])
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The controller and processor shall ensure that the data protection officer
does not receive any instructions regarding the exercise of those tasks. He
or she shall not be dismissed or penalised by the controller or the processor
for performing his tasks. The data protection officer shall directly report to
the highest management level of the controller or the processor (GDPR, 38
[3])
Tasks of DPO
to monitor compliance with this Regulation, with other Union or Member
State data protection provisions and with the policies of the controller or
processor in relation to the protection of personal data, including the as-
signment of responsibilities, awareness-raising and training of staff involved
in processing operations, and the related audits (GDPR, 39 [1][b])
to act as the contact point for the supervisory authority on issues relating
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